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ISSUES RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT THAT ARE

ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEF

I.

THE TAX COMMISSION BELIEVES IT WAS NOT COMPELLED TO ACCEPT
THE STIVERS OFFER OF A PROPERTY BOND IN LIEU OF A CASH DEPOSIT

II.

THE TAX COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT IS
BOUND BY IDAHO CODE IN THIS INSTANCE

III.

THE TAX COMMISSION BELIEVES IT IS NOT SUBJECT. IN GENERAL, TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ITS ACTIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The matter on appeal before the court does not address directly whether the Stivers have
a tax liability. It will merely allow for a trial de nova which will settle that question, but will also
review the Commission's auditing process in this case and its policies in general which result in
the selective enforcement of the tax code. The Commission has come under increasing criticism
in recent years for a cronyism which serves the current political regime (Court Record pages 5963). The collection of taxes in Idaho ought to be apolitical.
The Appellants believe the discovery process and placing certain individuals under oath
,vill reveal that the auditing process from its inception was politically motivated (Court Record
page 73). If true. it might be that only the Idaho Supreme Court has sufficient stature and
authority to balance the scales of justice.
This possible political motivation suggests that the Tax Commission initiated a "fishing
expedition" to create a tax liability for the Stivers. The Appellants wish to remind the Court of
the 'jurisdictional-fact doctrine" which provides that if evidence is presented challenging the
factual findings that triggered an agency's action, then a court may review the facts to determine
whether the agency had authority to act in the first place. An authority to act is NOT triggered
by an anonymous phone call by a well-placed political opponent.

Although formidable to the Stivers, a tax liability of$16,915 may seem to be a mere
pittance to the vast sums in controversy each and every day in Idaho's courtrooms. But the glory
of our republic is that the widow's mite is as precious and deserving of just recompense as is the
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wealth of the investment banker. The Stivers are like many working c1ass families throughout
the state, which, because of inflationary pressures have been forced into ever higher income tax
brackets. Most of them do not have the resources to hire clever accountants nor do they have
lobbyists in the legislature to keep them apprised of the latest tax loophole crafted by their
friendly legislator. They must pay property taxes, sales taxes, various excise taxes, fees, permits,
and host of other regressive taxes which fund much of their government. Only the income tax
presents itself as a progressive tax, yet because of its various schedules and deductions, it is not
It is possible for the wealthy to pay less tax than the poor.
The Stivers believe that they represent far more than their personal interests. They want
important questions to be settled on behalf ofldaho's working families. The first begins with the
question of a non-monetary surety to satisfy the deposit ru1e. In a day when few working
families have the resources or the credit to raise just a few thousand dollars, the property bond
serves the interest of justice.

In this respect, the Appellants would also like to mention the well-known "constitutionalfact doctrine" which is the rule that the courts are not bound by an administrative agency's
finding of fact when the facts involve whether the agency has exceeded constitutional limitations
on its power, especially in reference to personal rights. Let the following show it to be true.

7
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DOCTRINES OF APPELLATE REVIEW
THE COURT SHOULD EMPLOY FOUR
DOCTRINES WHEN REVIEWING THIS

CASE

It is every pro se litigant's fear that some smaJI omission, or minor non-compliance with
technical procedure, implanted somewhere within the vast amount of paperwork comprising their
case, will have the inevitable effect of causing a self-destruct sequence that ends up imploding
the totality of their litigation, leaving them broke and defeated by what appears to them to be the
flimsiest of pretenses. In the interest of doing substantial justice, though, courts have created
safeguards that favor justice over strict compliance with technical procedure (i.e. l.R.C.P. l (a);
see also Sines v. Blaser. 98 Idaho 435, 439 ( 1977)). Because of the nature of this case, and
because of their status as non-attorneys, the Appellants are requesting that the Court employ four
well-known doctrines when analyzing the Appellants' Briefs.

1)

Construction Vt Res Magis Va/eat Quam Pereat "that the matter may have

effect rather than fail"
While prose iitigants are generally expected to follow the same rules as attorneys, (Litz

i-,

Robinson, 131 Idaho 282 (Ct.App.1997); Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99 (2005)) their fiJings,
nonetheless, should be viewed with considerable liberality. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 {l 980);

Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Kennedy v. National Juvenile Detention Associa1ion.
187 F.3d 690,696 (7th Cir.1999); Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730 (5th Cir.2002); Smith v.

J.Iensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3rd Cir.2002); Chance v. Armstrong. 143 F.3d 698 (ZndCir.1998);
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Ortez\'. Washington Coun~v. 88 F.3d 804 (9thCir.1996); Amonel/i v Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422
{7

th

Cir.1996). Pro se litigants cannot be expected to draft pleadings and motions with as much

technical specificity as practicing attorneys. Granting a liberal or equitable construction of the
Appellants' arguments can allow the Court to give effect to a matter rather than having it fail.
Similar in theory to this "prose liberality rule'' are the doctrines of stare decisis exception,

questions ofgreat public importance, and First Amendment record review.
By way of application, as lay persons unlearned in the 1aw. common citizens will protest
an administrative ruling because of a "gut feeling'' that something is wrong. Attorneys may not
always be helpful because, as officers of the court, they are trained to ''manage'' their cases and
avoid adding to the strained work-load of the justice system. It is often ]eft to the ]earned
prescience of the court as to whether a particular case argued poorly by the pro se litigant may
yet be useful in settling recurring controversies which plague the judicial system because of a
poorly worded statute or opportunistic administrative agency.

2)

Stare Decisis EICeption

Stare decisis dictates that a court must scrupulously adhere to the precedents of its previous
decisions. However, courts also recognize that over time, circumstances change, and to
continua1ly adhere to precedent may have the unintended consequence of actually harming those
deserving of the court's protection. From these conditions have the courts carved out the
exceptions to stare decisis. In Idaho, the Supreme Court has described the rule as follows:
"[T]he rule of stare decisis dictates that we foilow [controlling
precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over
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time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedv continued
·
injustice."
Reyes v. Kit Manufacturing, 131 Idaho 239 (1998), quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson.
119 Idaho 72, 77 {l 990).
In this case, the Respondent has relied upon misapplied court decisions (e.g. Tarbox. as
will be shown) and a legal doctrine (administrative immunity) which is foreign to the free
institutions of our society.

Questions of Great Public Importance
The questions ofgreat public importance doctrine allows a court to avoid the normal prohibition
against deciding a constitutional question if the case could be decided on other grounds. It also
allows a court to pass on what could be considered a 'technical' challenge, if ruling on such
would prevent the court from deciding a much larger controversy that is directly affecting the
public at large.
"The conclusion we have reached, concerning the merits of this case,
convince us of the public importance of a decision upon the
constitutional question raised. Since the case has been fulJy briefed
and argued on the merits, and in light of its great public importance, it
is thought that we should reserve our opinion on the question of
technical procedure and pass upon the merits of the case at this time
and set the question at rest."
Luker v. Curtis. 64 Idaho 703 ( 1943 ). See also Brandt v. Idaho (Com 'n for Pardons and Parole,

135 Idaho 208 (Ct.App.2000); Gawron v. Roberts. 113 Idaho at 332 (1987); Russell v. Fortney,
111 Idaho 179, 180 (1986); Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney. 134 Idaho 98, 101 (2000); Stale v.

Henderson, 119 ldaho 579,580 (Ct.App.1991), et al.
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In the great "Whiskey Rebellion" which challenged the first tax ever implemented by the

federal government, it was found by President Washington that Congress had failed to issue
coinage into circulation by which the tax could be paid and secondly, it had failed to establish a
judicial circuit which could service the populations in and to the west of the Appalachians. The
distance of the courts and the lack of coinage in circulation made the tax onerous to frontier
settlers, who then resorted to arms to resolve their grievances. The shortcomings were hastily
corrected by Congress.
The lesson to be learned is that no tax can be enforced effectively if the general
population lacks the love of country to support it or if they believe it favors one group of citizens
with privileges over another. The moral authority to collect taxes is seriously compromised if
the taxing authority is perceived as an extension of political cronyism.
In this case, the opportunity is presented to the court to investigate the Tax Commission
and use its constitutional powers of judicial review to begin the process of tax refom1 in the State
ofldaho.

4)

First Amendment Record Review

A general rule of appellate review is that courts will not search the record for unspecified errors.

However, in cases that implicate the First Amendment. the United States Supreme Court has held
that it is a court's duty to make an independent review of the entire record on appeal, "so as to

assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field offree
expression." N~- York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S_ 254 (1964). See also Bose C,0rporation v.
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Consumers Union of United States, Inc .. 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Melton v. City ofOkiahoma City,
879 F.2d 706 (1989); Andersen v. McCotter, iOO F.3d 723, 725 (10 01 Cir.1996).

We normally think of First Amendment rights as pertaining to free speech in the public
square and elsewhere, but rarely do we see the various fi1tering devices - such as the 20%
deposit rule -- as a mechanism to limit the citizen's opportunity to exercise his First Amendment
rights in perhaps the most important venue of all: the courtroom before a judge who has the
power to grant him justice.

rn this case, it would appear that citizens who are wealthy or who have the favor of banks
and bank-related entities, can have their day in court, while other citizens who are not so
fortunate, must surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse steps.

Summary:

These four concepts, or doctrines - pro se liberality, stare decisis exception, questions

of great public importance, and First Amendment record review -- are all, essential1y,
exceptions to established rules that were put in place so that courts can effectively render justice
in certain situations.

In the instant case, the Appellants are asking the Supreme Court to make

use of all four to assure that justice is served.
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RESPONDENT'S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE CASE

Respondent errs in presenting this case as merely a routine appeal of an administrative
ruling. The AppeJlants' complaint constituted a request for a trial de novo and a common law
remedy in the alternative from the district court. The district court, finding itselflimited by
statute from judicial review of the Commission's determination, could have and ought to have
pursued the common law option if it suspected misdeeds on the part of the Commission:
"'The district court has inherent power to pass upon its own jurisdiction. Robinson v.
Robinson, 70 Idaho 122,128,212 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1949); Haines v. State Insurance
Fund, 65 Idaho 450, 456, 145 P.2d 833, 835-36 (1944), and such necessarily entails the
power to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes or court rules purporting to limit that
jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court in a remarkably similar case, Mendoza v.
Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1958), was succinct and to the
point:

If a statute 011 which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional,
the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding and since it may determine whether or not
it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of
the statute . .. (citations omitted)."
- Skogerson v. Lawrence and .McConnell,
Idaho Supreme Court, 6/8/1983
Appellants believe the district court should have recognized its subject-matter
jurisdiction. No administrative body has the coercive authority to burden - by taxation or
otherwise

any natural person in the exercise of his or her Rights. As the United States Supreme

Court asserted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105 480-487, (1943):

"It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms
would be unconstitutional.»
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In reference to the taxing of labor, the principle is further delineated in Butcher's Union
Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (] 883):
''The right to follow any of the common occupations oflife is an inalienable
right"
and,

"It has been well said that 'the property which every man has in his own labor, as
it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his
own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what
manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this
most sacred property'!'
The common right of man in his own labor is not a subservient right to other inalienable
rights - mentioned or unmentioned - in America's founding documents, nor is it weakened
by his right to contract:
"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property partaking of the nature of each- is the right to make contracts for the acquisition
of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employmeni, by which
labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property.''
- Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. l (1915)
Other courts have expressed this principle as well:
..Since the right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every
person, this right cannot be taxed as privilege."
- Jack Cole Company v. Alfred T. MacFarland, Commissioner, 206 Tenn. 694.
337 S.W. 2d 453 Supreme Court ofTennessee (1960)
"An income tax is neither a property tax nor a tax on occupations of common
right, but is an excise tax ... The legislature may declare as 'privileged' and tax
as such for state revenue, those pursuits not matters of common right, but it has no
power to declare as a 'privilege' and tax for revenue purposes, occupations that
are of common right."
- Simms v. Ahrens, 271 SW 720 (1925)

14
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Even though there is no mention of the income tax in Idaho's Constitution, we may
surmise that the legislature and the courts have somehow classified ''income tax'' as an excise tax
upon property or privilege. The Appellants do not profess to know the particulars of this
doctrine, but do argue that there is something inherently wrong with enforcing an income tax on
poor people - poor people being defined, as the court said as cited above - the working man who
uses the "strength and dexterity of his own hands."
Armed with the knowledge that the Stivers work for themselves in a family business
which involves physical labor, it should have been apparent to the district court that common
rights were at stake. The Stivers should have been allowed to proceed to discovery and establish
their arguments.

15
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WHY TARBOX AND AG AIR DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE
The Respondent says in summary on page 6 of his brief:
..Both Tarbox and Ag Air stand for the proposition that the failure to make the required.
cash deposit deprived both the BTA and the district court of jurisdiction to hear Stivers'
appeal.''
Yet, even Tarbox makes exception in the case of indigency, as cited in the Court Record,
page 49:

"I . Taxation. Absent contention or showing that taxpayers were indigent or that they
could not have obtained bond money by procuring loan on equity in their home, district
court did not err in refusing to waive surety bond requirement and dismissing appeal ... "
The Stivers' did claim indigency during the critical time of appeal and they did claim by
sworn affidavit their failed attempts to obtain loans on the equity of their home, which because
of a failure in the banking system at the time, was not from any fault of their own. They have
been prepared to substantiate that claim at every step of this process and expected to do so during
discovery.
More fundamentally, however, an indigent is not merely a person who is unable to pay,
but can also be a "poor" person as defined by the Butcher's Decision cited above, someone
who's only means of sustenance comes from his own labor.
Black's Law Dictionary (9 th Edition) lists it as the first definition:

indigent (in-di-j::mt), n. ( 15c) l. A poor person. 2. A person who is found to be
financiaJJy unable to pay filing fees and court costs and so is allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis.
While anyone can perform manual labor and many occupations do so, we may surmise
from the Butcher's Decision that the poor man has no other means oflivelihood except from his
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own labor. Thus, the rich man may engage in physical labor, but because he also enjoys the
privilege of making a living from the labor of others, he is not poor or indigent.
This may appear to be a novel interpretation, but it is one grounded in established legal
doctrine:
''It is to be noted that, by the language of the Act, it is not salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal services that are to be included in gross income. That which is
to be included is gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal services.''
- Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74 L. Ed. 731 (1930)
(emphasis added)

As a layman in the law, the Appellants do not profess to understand this legal doctrine,
onlv
to have a "aut
feelina"
as expressed in the words of the former Sen. John Danforth from the
•
0
e,
State of Missouri when he took the floor of the U.S. Senate and said: "We should not be taxing
poor people."

1-/
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

THE TAX COMl\.-USSION DOES NOT HAVE A POLICY TO FULFILL
THE "OTHER SECURITY" CLASSIFICATION PROVIDED BY STATUTE
We may surmise that all Jaws enacted by the Idaho Legislature are constiiutional because
they fulfill that purpose of the Idaho Constitution, which, according to its very first article, says

·'AU political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection
and benefit" and "no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be
altered, revoked, or repeaied by the legisiature" (Section 2).
It is reasonable to infer from this provision that all government workers, which would
include those who work for the Tax Commission, exercise a privilege. For example, their
immunity from personal liability for performing their duties is truly a spectacular benefit not
enjoyed by those employed in the private sector. Such workers enjoy these privileges and
immunities because they are, theoretically at least, protecting the inalienable rights of all citizens
equally.
When a legislature enacts a law governing an administrative agency, delineating its
powers and its duties, it cannot anticipate every contingency which might appear. Thus, there
are included clauses which provide discretion to administrators in the exercise of their duties.
Administrators are given this discretion by the legislature to empower them to act on behalf of
beleaguered citizens in situations unforeseen by the legislature. This power is entrusted to
administrators with the understanding that they will work on behalf of equality and justice.
The "Other Security'' clause of LC. 63-3049 is just such a discretionary empowerment. It
can have no other purpose than to help the citizen obtain his "day in court" should he disagree
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with the findings of the Commission. It does not exist for the benefit of the Tax Commission. It
exists for the benefit of the taxpayer and citizen.
At this juncture, the Stivers are still waiting for a response from the Commission of what
that "'Other Security" might be. To date, there has been no policy statement produced, no
criteria, not even an internal memo which would demonstrate the Commission's due diligence to
provide content to that provision and which would give other acceptable alternatives for
taxpayers who cannot qualify for the pecuniary indicia which precedes it in the statute. We must
conclude that there is no ·'Other Security" classification and thus, administratively speaking, this
part of the statute has no content, but is rather left to the arbitrary and perhaps capricious
imagination of whoever might be in charge of enforcement at the time. We find this lack of
content or process, in the very least, to suggest administrative dereliction
The Stivers offered a property bond; it was denied because the Tax Commission did not
want to be a banker and be burdened with the task of foreclosing on a lien (Court Record, page
17, 34-35). We thought that tax liens were something tax collectors do every day. We found it
to be a strange, ad hoc explanation.
Could there be another explanation more sinister? Is it possible that various members of
the Tax Commission are heavily invested in banks and bonding companies? We would like to
know. Maybe it would be bad for business if the property bond became a customary alternative
to predatory lenders and bondsmen. Maybe they imagine it would burden the courts with too
many poor people filing complaints against the Commission.

19
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THE 20°/4, DEPOSIT RULED ES NOT PRECLUDE THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE STATE
A.

The Respondent quotes the court in the Tarbox Decision to say. "Although these

jurisdictional provisions may seem harsh, it is an established rule that "'the government has the
right to prescribe the conditions on which it will subject itself to the judgment of the courts in the

co11ection of its revenues.'" - Thus in an attempt to establish some sort of administrative
immunity from judicial review.
This statement originates in the Cheatham v. United States Decision of 1875. It might be
useful to add a portion of the subsequent paragraph to enlighten our understanding of the court at
the time:

"If there existed in the courts, State or National, any general power of impeding or
controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation. the very
existence of the government might be placed in the power of a hostile judiciary."
And in a previous paragraph,

"All governments, in all times, have found it necessary to adopt stringent measures for
the collection of taxes, and to be rigid in the enforcement of them."
Thus, the Court tells us that our republic differs not from "all governments, in all times,"
a categorization which includes every despotism and tyrant of history. It is difficult to imagine
what dangers might exist from a "hostile judiciary," considering that every abuse of government

power has occurred, perhaps in spite of, but never because of, a hostile judiciary. A compliant
judiciary is usually the mark of despotism.

20
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Nevertheless, conceding every point c1aimed by the Respondent and these decisions
which he cites, we must reply that they rest upon an important but overlooked distinction: the
object of these decisions was the collection of indirect taxes p n privileges. None of these
claimed to enforce a scheme of taxation upon natural rights. Since one part of the Constitution
cannot be used to defeat or nullify another, it can be argued that these decisions did not have in
their sights the meager earnings of the working man. These are held to be a part of his
inalienable natural rights.
B.

The Idaho Constitution empowers the legislature with the power to regulate the lower

courts, but not the Supreme Court (Article V, Section 13):
"The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or
jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government"
And in Section 2:
"The jurisdiction of such inferior courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature."
"The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state"
although it is recommendatory only (Section 10), and it has original jurisdiction to issue the great
\\Tits of common law (Section 9).
While the Appellants recognize that the 20% deposit rule a n d ~ may limit the
jurisdiction of the district courts - lacking clear evidence of wrong doing or egregious
constitutional usurpation by the Tax Commission - Appellants argue that this is not true of the
Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court is endowed with a stature co-equal to the other
branches of government and can hear this case.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
1. Tarbox et al misapplied the Cheatham Decision and others from the 19th century - a time
when governments taxed privileges ·- to now tax natural rights, a power not contemplated
by the nation's founding documents.
2. Even when misapplied, Tarbox still recognizes the rights of the indigent to be considered
for exemption from the 20% deposit rule.
3. The first and principal definition of the word "indigent," as it is legally understood, is that
of "a poor person" and in the second sense, as ·'a person unable to pay." In the Butcher's
Decision, the U.S. Supreme Court defined a poor person as the person engaged in manual
labor as his only "patrimony!' His right to labor and to be free from being taxed upon his
labor was identified by the highest coun as a natural right.
4. It is the purpose and role of government to protect the citizen's natural rights. Tfthe state
government can tax those natural rights. it can destroy them: following John Marshall's
dictum, "The power to tax is the power to destroy."
5. In denying to the Stivers their offer of a property bond as "Other Security" in lieu of the
20% cash deposit, the Tax Commission is not fulfilling its role as guardian of natural
rights but instead is attacking those rights, taxing them, and contriving a system by which
the poor are denied their day in court to defend them.
6. Should this Court yield to the arguments of the Commission, it would affirm its claim of
administrative immunity from judiciai review. It would be acquiescence to a role
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subservient to the legislative branch and a denial of the proper role of government to
protect the naturai rights of its citizens.

The Appellants once again petition the Court to reinstate their case and overturn the
district court's order to dismiss.

Respectfully submitted this 27'!1 day of November, 2012

James W. Stivers, Pro Se
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Certificate of Service by Mail
I, James Stivers, certify that on this 27th day of November, 2012, I served two copies of the
foregoing APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIBF by sending the same by certified mail with proof
herein attached to:
Phil N. Skinner
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 36
Boise, ID 83722
Attorney for the Idaho State Tax Commission
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